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Dan Pinchbeck 
Trigens Can’t Swim 
Intelligence and Intentionality in First Person Game Worlds
This paper explores the role of the intentional stance in games, 
arguing that any question of artificial intelligence has as much 
to do with the co-option of the player’s interpretation of actions 
as intelligent as any actual fixed-state systems attached to 
agents. It demonstrates how simply using a few simple and, in 
system terms, cheap tricks, existing AI can be both supported 
and enhanced. This includes representational characteristics, 
importing behavioral expectations from real life, constraining 
these expectations using diegetic devices, and managing social 
interrelationships to create the illusion of a greater intelligence 
than is ever actually present. It is concluded that complex artifi-
cial intelligence is often of less importance to the experience of 
intelligent agents in play than the creation of a space where the 
intentional stance can be evoked and supported.
 
Intentionality and Games
In 1969, seven years after SPACEWAR! (1962), but still quite firmly 
within the pre-history of computer games, Dennett argued that
A computer can only be said to be believing, remembering, pursu-
ing goals, etc., relative to the particular interpretation put on its 
motions by people, who thus impose their own way of life upon 
the computer […]. Thus, computers, if they are intentional, are 
only intentional in virtue of the intentionality of their creators 
(Dennett 1969:40).
Whilst Dennett was referring to an intentionality imbued into a sys-
tem by its programmer, this paper deals with a slightly different 
concept: the intentionality created by a series of cues and effects 
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attached to fixed-state systems in games. The fundamentally impor-
tant issue with agents in games is not their intelligence but rather its 
appearance: the interpretation of their actions as intelligent by the 
player. A smart agent whose intelligence is not believable is not, to 
the player, a smart agent, regardless of their internal complexity. As 
games increase in complexity, in terms of both sensory fidelity and 
semantic structures, issues with breakdowns in the created diegesis 
are amplified. At the same time, agents become ever more important 
as means of carrying the action and controlling the flow of activity: 
it is telling that of the major first person shooter (FPS) titles released 
between 1998-2008, the vast majority contain persistent non-player 
characters (NPC) represented in-game, and over half feature either 
squad-based activity, or inter-agent conflict in significant portions of 
the ludic arc. It is recognized that game AI is usually fairly simple (in 
artificial intelligence terms, of course), with Adams and Rollings even 
going so far as to say, “most current video games do not, in fact, con-
tain much real AI” (Adams/Rollings 2007:21). What this paper aims to 
demonstrate, however, is that when considering the impact of intel-
ligence of agents in games, rather than the state systems themselves, 
it is often the cuing, by the system, of the adoption of the intentional 
stance in the player, and a selection of cheap and simple semantic 
tricks that achieves as much in terms of the player projecting intelli-
gence into the system. Butcher and Griesemer report on play-testing 
the artificial intelligence of HALO’s (2001) enemy avatars:
Even if you make something as obvious as you can possibly make 
it, half the people will miss it the first three times they see it. In 
HALO the Grunts run away when an Elite is killed. Initially nobody 
noticed so we had to keep adding clues to make it more obvious 
By the time we shipped we had made it so not only does every 
single Grunt run away every single time an Elite is killed but they 
all have an outrageously exaggerated panic run where they wave 
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their hands above their heads, they scream in terror and half the 
time one of them will say ‘Leader Dead, Run Away!’ I would still 
estimate that less than a third of our users made the connection 
(Butcher/Griesemer: 2002).
Intelligence in games is restricted by players; in terms of both what 
they will recognize and what they will accept. What Butcher and Gri-
esemer are describing is a failure on the part of the player to read an 
intentional cue. The actual intelligence of the Grunts, as dynamic 
objects in a computer space, is largely irrelevant next to this issue. 
Another example may help here. BLACKSITE (2007) makes much of 
its squad based action, where keeping the morale of the assistive 
agents is of high importance and that the ongoing relationship with 
these agents was central to the affective experience of the game. 
Amongst the many faults of BLACKSITE, however, is the occasional 
inability of the in-game agents to look the player in the eye. Attempt-
ing to form a connection with a character who, regardless of one’s at-
tempts to rectify it, appear to stare obsessively over one’s left shoul-
der is not simply unnerving, but hugely damaging to any sense of 
intentionality that the clearly complex state-system attached to the 
agent is trying to provoke. A failure to achieve something as funda-
mental as facing the avatar undermines any more complex AI than 
might be in the game. However, when this basic feature is attached 
to characterization, the result can be quietly breathtaking. Consider 
HALF LIFE 2’s lauded persistent agent Alyx Vance. Glancing across 
from the driver’s seat in EPISODE TWO’s (2007) “Riding Shotgun”, 
to catch Alyx smiling happily at Freeman, then looking away as if 
she realizes she’s been caught staring is quite unnerving: it’s simply 
such a (small) human action. 
 Indeed, several recent research papers have, rather than trying 
to make agents smarter, tried to make them more natural (Horswill/
Zubek 1999, Freed et al. 2000); which is to say they try and improve 
the likelihood of behavior being interpreted via the intentional stance. 
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Gorman and Humphrys, arguing for an AI model based upon agents 
learning to imitate player behavior, lament that 
Modern, commercial computer games rely primarily on AI tech-
niques that were developed several decades ago, and until recently 
there has been little impetus to change this. Despite the fact that 
the computer-controlled agents in such games often possess abili-
ties far in advance of the limits imposed on human participants, 
competent players are capable of easily beating their artificial op-
ponents, suggesting that approaches based on the analysis and 
imitation of human play may produce superior agents, in terms of 
both performance and believability (Gorman/Humphrys 2006:1).
We will not dwell on the performance issue here; it is the question 
of believability that concerns us, in particular the inherent criticism 
Gorman and Humphrey make that old fashioned, fixed-state artificial 
intelligence falls short of offering this. However, Dennett’s intentional 
stance does not, critically, require the object of its gaze to actually 
be in any way intentional in itself. Rather, it is down to us: “we must 
treat the noise-emitter as an agent, indeed a rational agent, who 
harbors beliefs and desires and other mental states that exhibit in-
tentionality” (Dennett 1991:76, italics mine) and we can demonstrate 
this by offering a simple example from perhaps the earliest of what 
we might call the modern shooters.
 One of the many brilliant things about DOOM (1993) is the fact 
that if a Zombie accidentally shoots an Imp, the Imp retaliates by 
hurling a fireball right back at the guilty party. Once a player has 
realized this, they can use it to their advantage, trying to maneuver 
different classes of agent in front of one another in the hope of start-
ing an inter-agent gunfight that will thin the opposition out before 
they have to wade in themselves. What is also added to the mix, per-
haps even more importantly, is the ability of the player to virtually 
bootstrap the actual intelligence inherent in the system, to a higher, 
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anthropomorphized level. An extremely crude input-output response 
provides the player with the tools they need to enhance their projec-
tion of intentionality onto the agent, deepening the experience and 
layering capacity into a system that outstrips its actual complexity.
Fig. 1: Imps and Zombies in Doom (Screenshot): Both AI and visual 
representation are very simple.
 
DOOM’s imps and zombies are intelligent in only the most rudimen-
tary way but it does not matter. The imp turned on the zombie be-
cause it was hurt and responded in rage; the reaction is easy to an-
thropomorphize because it is so familiar. Critically, although it does 
not require intentionality, cognition, or any form of evident higher 
order deliberation to be anchored to the agent, merely a simple rule, 
it is recognizably, anthropomorphically instinctive and causal. The 
imp attacked the zombie because the zombie shot the imp.
Action | Space
247
From Simple Rule to Complex Behavior
“Functions” according to Searle, “are never intrinsic, but are always 
observer relative.” (Searle 1995:14). – Consider the following:
IF [CHANGE AGENT STATE] = reduce HEALTH by 10 or more, 
THEN:
HEALTH = HEALTH -n
MOVE = MOVE +10
RESPONSE TIME = RESPONSE TIME +20
% of SHOOTING = % of SHOOTING +20
ACCURACY = ACCCURACY -20
This is obviously a very simple version state system, but what it dem-
onstrates is that adjusting even a small number of pre-existing vari-
ables provides high potential for interpretation. Our agent, on being 
wounded, will move faster and react more quickly. It is much more 
likely to fire on any object that fits the definition of a target (at the 
most simple, an object moving within a defined field relative to the 
agent), but it will be much less accurate. A subjective interpretation 
of rage or panic is unproblematic – it perhaps even resembles the 
‘fight or flight’ reflex.
 Any cues for anthropomorphism, once added to the agent’s avail-
able actions, and judging by the simplicity of the state-system and 
visual representation of DOOM’s Imps, are enough to initiate the 
intentional stance. Very simple rules of behavior, supported by an 
appropriate context of action, enable the anthropomorphizing ten-
dencies of the intentional stance to bootstrap function into new con-
ceptual – and illusory – degrees of projected mind. 
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Fig. 2: Far Cry’s Trigens (Screenshot): Prior to seeing them, we are told they 
are genetically engineered apes, the visual appearance and movement then 
supports this.
 
Let us start with FAR CRY (2004) and their mutant monkey menace: 
Trigens. In the game, Trigens can’t swim: a Trigen will drown if it en-
ters even relatively shallow water. This co-opts our folk theory about 
apes (consider the last time you saw, whether in daily life or via televi-
sion, a gorilla swimming). Trigens will not thus not enter water, but 
may be tricked into doing so – a quick duck as they leap to attack can 
become a potent weapon. Given the information that Trigens cannot 
swim and Trigens do not normally enter the water, the most economi-
cal interpretation is the anthropomorphized Trigens are afraid of wa-
ter. This, given our lack of experience of swimming gorillas, makes 
ecological sense. In essence we are filling the gap between cues with 
an inference deliberately set-up by the system. A gorilla that leapt into 
the water and commenced backstroke is something that, based on 
our folk understanding of the world, would give us pause for thought.
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 On the other hand, people can swim, so it would be strange to 
find an entire army of non-swimmers. Thus, FAR CRY’s Mercs will 
happily enter the water and swim. Here, however, we can find a good 
example of a breakdown of implied intentionality. On entering the 
water, Mercs have a bad habit of staying put until they are encour-
aged to leave or are picked off by the player. Indeed, whole groups 
can be enticed into the water at once by a few well-aimed shots or 
even tossed rocks to get their attention. This creates a kind of odd 
pool party, complete with eight to ten professional killers treading 
water together indefinitely whilst hurling abuse at an unseen adver-
sary. Unlike the apparent – and apparently sensible – reluctance of 
the Trigens to enter the water, the Mercs appear to love paddling so 
much they see no reason to get back onto dry land, despite the fact 
they cannot use their weapons whilst swimming and appear fully 
aware that an armed and dangerous enemy is in the vicinity. There 
are two things we can draw from this: firstly that a breakdown of in-
tentionality is caused by a conflict of two behaviors: the Mercs have 
shifted state into a combat mode (i.e. they are tracking the last sight/
sound of the player and are barking appropriately) yet they have ren-
dered themselves defenseless and are not seeking a resolution to this 
problem. The second is pure inference based on ecological validity: 
no human being in their right mind would put themselves in such a 
position, and the pool party effect does not fit any imported schema 
for human behavior within this ecological context. 
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Fig. 3: A Far Cry ‘Pool Party’ (Screenshot): Even though the Mercs are being 
shot at, they continue to swim defenselessly.
 
Compare this to the kinds of overheard conservations between Mer-
cs triggered by the player aiming the binoculars at them from a safe 
distance.
Merc One: We’re twenty feet from the equator here, genius.
It’s Micronesia, for crying out loud.
Merc Two: Sure, but if it’s not the heat it’s the bugs. I hate bugs.
There are three things to note about this. Firstly, it does not involve 
any intelligence to be attached to the agents in any way; it is simply 
a triggered audio file. Secondly, it is not essential; the player can com-
plete the entire game without experiencing this conversation or any 
other conversation like it. No actual information of any significance 
to play is delivered by it; unlike if one of the Mercs had said “…and I 
spent six hours guarding that goddamn grenade store in the locked 
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hut by the beach… You know the one with the brass key we keep 
hidden under the bucket in the pig shed”. What it does do is expand 
the potential for the intentional stance to be adopted towards the 
Mercs: we are given information that allows this to happen by telling 
us that they know where in the world they are (and thus also reaf-
firms they are in the world); one dislikes the heat but not as much as 
he hates bugs (he has thoughts about many things). Finally, we are 
also given a status relationship between the two, as the derogatory 
“genius” comment suggests we are hearing a conversation between 
two equals (they have a social life outside the game). Finally, the con-
versational tone, its informal banter, sets up a relationship that has 
a temporal span: we can project that these agents know one another 
and have done for some time (they have a history outside the game).
 What is essentially happening is that the intentional complexity 
is being virtually increased by a triggered audio file. This extends 
the process noted with the original DOOM’s inter-agent conflict in 
personalizing two agents. We are given specific information that can 
be used to derive extended intentionality. Now, as soon as they be-
come aware of the player, they will revert to depersonalized combat 
behavior but, however fleetingly, they have been individualized, and 
this has been accomplished by supporting a relatively simple, shal-
low deployment of information that works because it is ecologically 
valid: two bored men stand around complaining about their lot. The 
very banality of the conversation gives it a depth; it is eminently rec-
ognizable, and it humanizes what are for all other intents and purpos-
es, simple agents. Likewise, a Covenant Grunt in HALO will scream 
and run away when its Elite is killed, but it will never beg for its life. 
But the panic and cowardice that is displayed is enough to help the 
player bootstrap the simple bot up to a more complex level of inten-
tionality.
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Ecological Validity
Avoiding water is just one way in which an agent can relate to the 
environment. Just the simple act of ducking for cover enables us to 
draw the inference from an agent that it is environmentally aware 
– it has a degree of self-knowledge. If it can distinguish between a 
normal barrel (a good place to take cover) and an exploding barrel (a 
bad place to take cover), this is increased dramatically. The way in 
which Steelhead Chimeras from RESISTANCE: FALL OF MAN (2006) 
use their Augur rifles is another good example of this. One of the 
game’s several special function weapons, the Augur will target en-
emies and hit them through walls, and Steelheads will use this rather 
than engage the player directly. In system terms, this decreases the 
complexity of the task of line-of-sight aiming, as the Steelhead just 
orientates to the player’s position regardless of what is between the 
two points. From an affective point of view, however it increases in-
tentionality: the Steelheads know where Kale is hiding and will flush 
him out into the open by targeting him through a wall. They know 
their capabilities in relation to the environment. Just as a Trigen is 
not only aware of water; it understands it should not enter water, a 
Steelhead is aware of Kale and understands that even though it can-
not see him, it can still hit him. A Merc is both aware of, and under-
stands the purpose of (and, on a third level, can exploit) an alarm box 
on a tent pole. A Trigen is perceptually aware of the pole, in terms of 
collision detection, but has no demonstrable capacity to understand 
that the alarm box will summon more Mercs let alone the capacity to 
therefore set it off. Thus, for a Trigen, the alarm box affords nothing 
more than a constraint to movement, whereas for a Merc, it affords 
a means of calling reinforcements. Note that both of these are en-
tirely ecologically valid according to likely expectations. It would be 
as ecologically invalid for a Trigen to pick a phone and call for help as 
it would be for a Merc not to use an alarm. The point is that the se-
mantic characterization of the agent has a profound influence upon 
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the expectations of its behavioral set and that, in turn, can be used to 
manage the actual state system required in order to implement it.
 To put this another way, DOOM 3’s (2004) assorted demons and 
zombies are profoundly stupid, in that they rarely take advantage of 
the environment, but their lack of complex interaction with the envi-
ronment is validated by their semantic attributes: they are zombies, 
after all. As a result, a vastly simplified relationship with the envi-
ronment can be established that retains ecological validity. DOOM 
3 bypasses the problem of requiring complex relationships between 
agents and environments by using the living dead or beasts from Hell 
– with a distinctly less than human lack of interest in anything other 
than dismembering the player. HALO’s marines and Covenant are 
somewhat similarly marooned on an alien and ineffable world. Not 
only do they thus have no real means of interacting with Forerunner 
technologies, but they are in extreme, pseudo-liminoid psychological 
states that support this non-interaction: the Covenant are fanatics, 
the humans are desperate. Thus, a powerful means of ensuring the 
state system has ecologically valid behaviors of doing this is adjust-
ing the semantic characteristics of the agent in question. 
 Thus, simple rule sets are often deployed within a liminoid world, 
where everyday activity has been suspended, or through liminoid 
entities, which exist outside the expected complexities of normal 
behavior (Pinchbeck 2006, Dovey/Kennedy 2006). The crew and Ma-
rines of the Pillar of Autumn are in battle from the outset, as are the 
troops battling across the surface of Stroggos in QUAKE 4 (2005). It 
would simply not be ecologically valid to find them shopping for veg-
etables or cleaning their cars. Even easier to manage are demonic or 
alien populations: the majority of the FPS populations fall into this 
category, and the system can assume a far greater degree of control 
over the expectations of validity inherent in such populations. In-
tentionality is sandwiched between expectations managed through 
semantic characterization on one hand, and ecological validity as 
evidenced by appropriate actions on the other.
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Factions and Social Intelligence
Factions are sets of allegiances that group agents. For example, in 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R. (2007), human agents are divided into the factions of 
Stalkers, Bandits, Army, Duty, Freedom and Monolith – the division 
separates out what are essentially the same agents. Thus, factions 
can add complexity and depth to the agent population without re-
quiring an expansion of agent types: S.T.A.L.K.E.R. also contains a 
number of visually distinct animal, mutant and supernatural entities.
Fig. 4: Two Human Agents in S.T.A.L.K.E.R. (Screenshot): Although they 
belong to different factions, they are the same basic agent.
 
Similarly, they are useful for adding complexity where an increase in 
agent numbers may damage ecological validity. DEUS EX (2000) may 
be futuristic, but it attempts to create a recognizably ‘realistic’ cyber-
punk near-future; having too many non-human agents would place a 
strain upon this diegesis (it could be argued that it already struggles 
with Greasels and Karkians, although, perhaps due to its co-option of 
well known conspiracy themes, not with Greys). The large number of 
competing factions in the game, however, allows for a huge diversity 
of human troop agents simply by affiliation (and a few adjustments to 
visual appearance). By contrast, QUAKE 4 has many agent types, but 
only two factions – human and Strogg. This distinction establishes 
a very different approach to play: in the latter, if it’s not human, it’s 
safe to shoot without any further thought. In the former, there are 
implications for both action (is this the right human to be shooting at) 
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and prediction (if I shoot the NSF agent, the UNATCO troops will side 
with me, but this may affect my ability to get inside the Mole People’s 
tunnels). In other words, by imposing factions into the population, 
the game system is suggesting that higher orders of intentionality 
are at work – and at stake. The Strogg have limited intentionality: it 
is enough to believe that they want to kill anything human, includ-
ing the player. On the other hand, the NSF may want to kill UNATCO 
troops, but this is actually because they believe UNATCO troops to 
be supporting a regime responsible for the spread of a lethal virus. 
Indeed, DEUS EX forces a confrontation between the initial political 
and moral stance of the player and the plot’s development when it is 
revealed that the player has been betrayed. The sequel, INVISIBLE 
WAR (2003), goes even further by not settling on an unambiguous 
nemesis like Page; all the factions are problematic and the player can 
side and switch until late in the game. Thus, the ramifications of their 
actions can be inferred through simple reactions of factional agents, 
increasing the order of intentionality the player has to invest in the 
game which, in turns, requires a different, more cognitively engaged 
style of play, which has implications for attentional resources and 
attached significance.
 Not only this, but factions allow broad-stroke reactions to be de-
livered across a wider group, in a conceptually similar manner to Sel-
fridge’s Pandaemonium (1959). What matters is the overall effect of 
many stupid process taken as a whole. Thus, rather than packing 
many demons into few agents, it is easier both in terms of system 
capacity and design, to include a larger number of stupid agents and 
make intentionality a product of generalized reaction across a fac-
tional group. For example, the Templar and Illuminati are fundamen-
tally opposed in Invisible War, and ApostleCorp are opposed to both. 
In the Cairo Acrology towards the end of the game, the player enters 
a hangar controlled by the Templar. The player has the choice of co-
operation or refusing. In the latter case, they must fight the Templar, 
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but gain respect from the Illuminati. In the former, they gain the al-
legiance of the Templar but lose this with the Illuminati. Whatever 
the outcome, the player then finds Paul Denton’s body in suspended 
animation. Denton can be revived or killed. Reviving him angers both 
Templar and Illuminati, but serves the agenda of ApostleCorp; killing 
him does the opposite.
 This is all fairly straightforward, but what is important to note is 
that the response to the player’s actions needs not be subtle. Be-
cause the political decisions are depersonalized, the level of required 
representation is reduced. When the player tells the Templar to “Go 
to Hell” and they immediately attack, each individual Templar’s reac-
tion is unnecessary as they operate en masse. Each of the Templar is 
extremely stupid and has a tiny behavioral response set: Alex agrees 
to give blood: do not attack. Alex refuses to give blood, attack imme-
diately. But the combined mass of Templars enables a virtual, more 
complex affective response to be insinuated by the system. Likewise, 
all any individual Dutyer or Freedomer ‘knows’ is the relative position 
of Strelok along their allegiance bar, whereas the overall effect is of a 
group of individuals responding to the shifting tactics of the player. 
The system is responding apparently intelligently to the player, but 
the requirements of each individual agent are reduced, as the shift 
is illustrated by the avatar’s relative position to factions, rather than 
personalized reaction.
 So factions, in other words, may assist an ethical framework for 
activity, which itself requires a higher assumption of intentionality. 
A singular faction of agents, as we find in DOOM 3, leaves no room for 
consideration of approach. Inter-factional conflict, such as that found 
in HALO, DEUS EX, S.T.A.L.K.E.R. or FAR CRY inferred projected 
intentionality without the system having to do much additional work. 
Trigens will attack Mercs as well as they players, and Mercs see Tri-
gens as every bit as much of a threat, so the groups can be maneu-
vered into a position where they will attack one another, allowing 
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Jack Carver to slip past unnoticed. The application of this strategy 
depends upon the expectation of agents to act intentionally. Exactly 
the same is true of the Flood and the Covenant in HALO, and es-
sentially all DEUS EX and Invisible War do is allow a degree of choice 
in how this is manifested exactly. The actual behaviors of the Mercs 
and Trigens remains highly limited, but the simple factional conflict 
response allows a greater degree of intentionality to be inferred: We 
believe that the Mercs are concerned about the threat of the Trigens, 
who want to kill them, therefore, they will engage the Trigen unless 
they think we represent a greater threat.
 An agent’s capacity to both enable and manage the adoption of 
the intentional stance in a player is as important to its projected 
sense of intelligence as any innate properties of the underlying fixed-
state system. Not only that, but this can be achieved without com-
plex artificial intelligence, indeed, with just a few simple tricks and 
proper understanding of the role of environmental and social context 
in intelligence. With only a few simple rules, complex behaviors can 
be extrapolated and when these have a clear ecological validity, we 
naturally assume the intentional stance as the most economic means 
of dealing with the behavior. Thus, rather than noting the ludic struc-
tures which mean that Trigens will not enter water as they will be im-
mediately removed from play, we opt for the simpler version: Trigens 
do not enter the water because Trigens cannot swim. On the same 
level, Mercs should trigger alarms to get help because they are ‘in-
telligent’ people; Stroggs may be stupid, but this is alright, because 
they are little more than crudely reanimated cyborg corpses; Grunts 
are cowards, not technicians or philosophers. Simple evidence of 
predictable, contextual behavior is enough to trigger the intentional 
stance, through a process not dissimilar to narrative closure, and an 
information load that gives just enough to enable this process – but 
no more – will cover the remaining cracks. 
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 Thus, when Grunts run away, it makes the Covenant that much 
more acceptable as a virtual enemy. Faced with a one-man killing 
machine your comrades are already calling “The Demon”, who has 
cut swathes through your ranks and just wiped out your Elite line 
manager (who is twice your size and the only one amongst you likely 
to stand a chance in a fair fight), we can empathize with this response. 
It’s a truly sensible thing to do, a choice we’d all probably make under 
the circumstances. And with that simple masterstroke, it no longer 
matters where the Grunts sleep on their staggeringly empty battle-
ship, or who brings them their food, or letters from home, or any of the 
other things we may expect of a reasonably intelligent creature. We 
empathize, we attach intentionality because we recognize an eco-
logically valid act. If agents are to be believably intelligent, they must 
have characteristics we can identify with as showing evidence of 
intentionality, in an ecologically valid context, and this frequently has 
little to do with the complexity of the state system. Indeed, agents in 
games have a great deal to say to us about the notion of intentionality 
and its relationship to intelligence in general.
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